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Explaining Counter Terrorism in the UK: Normal politics, securitized 
politics or performativity of the neoliberal state? 
 
This paper seeks to explore the politics of counter terrorism in the UK. It argues that 
for a number of reasons, counter terrorism policy has been separated off from other 
policy areas and seen as securitised, exceptional or just different. The paper argues that 
such a separation from “normal” politics is problematic, both conceptually and 
empirically. It argues that much can be gained by considering counter terrorism policy 
through the lenses, concepts and debates which feature in other areas of British politics. 
The paper then examines two such lenses/debates – depoliticisation and neoliberalism. 
An argument is developed that counter terrorism policy is not, in the main, 
depoliticised, but rather overt, politicised and visible. This prominence, it is argued, is 
due to the ways in which neoliberalism has reduced many of the traditional roles of the 
state. Drawing on the work of Wacquant and Hall, the paper argues that in the absence 
of such traditional roles, counter terrorism offers the state an opportunity to perform its 
own “stateness”, to visibly display its sovereign power in a context of ever more (self-
imposed) diminished powers. 
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Introduction 
 
This article seeks to develop an argument that contemporary counter terrorism policy in the 
UK in part takes the particular form that it does to serve as a spectacle of sovereign power in 
an era of neoliberal governance where the state abjures many of its traditional roles. Counter 
terrorism is, in other words, a performance of state power in a context of a state which, under 
the influence of neoliberal ideas, elsewhere lacks performative power or essence. In making 
this argument, the paper seeks to contribute to debates about why security and counter 
terrorism takes the form that it does. In much literature around security politics, the focus has 
been on sovereign decision-making, whether this is in the form of securitisation theory or 
debates around exceptionalism. A related tendency is to see security policy like counter 
terrorism as exceptional and departing from established precedents and norms – or “normal” 
politics. The Paris School has sought to shift focus and attention to a broader range of actors, 
specifically bureaucrats within a “field” of security and unease management, yet arguably, 
retains a focus on security as different (Neal, forthcoming). 
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This paper seeks to explore three areas. At the broadest level, it seeks to examine why 
counter terrorism policy in the UK takes the particular form that it does. Secondly, it 
considers whether counter terrorism politics is all that different – in form and content – from 
other areas of politics. Finally, it turns to the question of the extent to which counter terrorism 
policy and politics is influenced by other aspects and dynamics of politics. To return to the 
overall argument that the paper seeks to make, it is the contention of the paper that there are 
reasons to think of counter terrorism as less isolated from other aspects of politics; that it is 
not so different to “normal” politics as one might think. And secondly, that once we make 
this move, connections between counter terrorism security politics and other aspects of 
politics, such as depoliticisation and neoliberalism suggest a holistic analysis which explains 
the content of UK counter terrorism politics in relation to other aspects of UK politics and not 
as separate from it. This analysis hypothesises that gaps and absences in many of the state’s 
traditional roles and functions, due to the influence of neoliberal ideas, create forms of 
insecurity, uncertainty and unease. In such a context, it might be argued that the particular 
focus on counter terrorism serves as a performance of stateness, which serves up solutions to 
(some) anxieties, and thus covering over wider, deeper, social, political and economic 
problems. The paper concludes by arguing that the broader political-economic context and its 
“strategic selectivity” (Jessop 2008) be given a fuller role in analyses. The paper seeks to 
make a contribution to and extend a number of different literatures, including debates about 
how we should understand the nature of security politics, “exceptionalism”, securitisation and 
what the Paris School refer to as the governmentality of unease and how this relates to 
broader state dynamics. It also seeks to contribute to a number of contemporary debates about 
the disciplinary or authoritarian nature of (contemporary) neoliberalism. 
 
The paper proceeds in three main sections. The first examines explanations of counter 
terrorism policy, such as executive/institutionalist and securitisation/exceptionalism. The 
second section focuses on explanations for security politics which move beyond a focus on 
executive will/action to a broader analysis, such as the Paris School. The final, longer, section 
argues that thinking of counter terrorism politics through some of the lenses and ideas which 
are influential in “normal” British politics, such as depoliticisation and neoliberalism permits 
a range of interesting sights, such as counter terrorism politics not being depoliticised 
(perhaps in contrast to areas of “normal” politics). Moreover, debates around neoliberalism 
raise the possibility that counter terrorism policy is politicised as it serves as a visible 
manifestation of the state’s power and influence in a context of state retrenchment. Building 
upon the Paris School and their work on the governmentality of unease, the paper focuses 
particularly on the work of Stuart Hall and Loic Wacquant. Hall’s work on authoritarian 
neoliberalism potentially helps to explain how state actors mobilise popular/populist consent 
for such a politics of spectacle (or distraction/displacement) and how such a (neoliberal) 
context “selects for” such a politics. 
 
Explaining UK Counter Terrorism Policy 
 
At face value, perhaps counter terrorism policy needs little or no explanation. One may 
simply accept the duty of the British state to protect its citizens from terrorism and therefore 
see counter terrorism as an inevitable reaction to the existence of terrorism. Yet even 
allowing for this, why has that action taken the form that it has? Why, for example, did the 
UK government seek, in 2006, to introduce a pre-charge detention period of up to 90 days 
(later settling on 28), a period which far outstrips that of other western states aiming to 
combat terrorism? Why, in 2015, did the UK government impose a statutory duty on a vast 
swathe of public (and some private) sector workers, to have ‘due regard to the need to 
4 
 
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (HM Government, 2015)? Why introduce 
and continue with the controversial Prevent policy?  
 
There are, at present, two main forms of explanation as to why counter terrorism policy in 
places like the UK takes the form and shape that it does. The first focuses on the executive, 
and legal/institutional frameworks or veto points. Here, research that does ask questions as to 
why states such as the UK have responded to terrorism in the different ways that they have 
does so in terms of constitutional and legal frameworks (Haubrich 2003; Roach 2011). One 
effect of this is to attempt to locate or explain counter terrorism within the executive branch 
(see Owens and Pelizzo 2009). Thus authors who have directly addressed this question have 
tended to focus on the ability of executives to enact stringent measures (often emphasising 
the role of public fear and threat perception, in association with institutional and political 
factors; see Roach 2011) without really exploring in significant detail, the extent to which 
executives and governments come to formulate what they should do. Arguments concerning 
the UK in such literatures posit a combination of public unease, strong single-party 
government, a comparatively weak judiciary and political opposition and a relative lack of 
interest group mobilisation (see Haubrich 2003, 28). These factors clearly have some 
importance in terms of what executives can do, but not all of the variation is explained by 
veto points, nor the executive’s (in)ability to get things done.  
 
The second main explanation originates within (critical) security studies and particularly 
around debates on exceptionalism and securitisation. In the wake of 9/11, many politicians 
were quick to invoke exceptional language to characterise the threat that terrorism posed and 
the consequent need for exceptional measures in response. Tony Blair (2001), soon after 9/11 
referred to it as a ‘turning point in history’, whilst the UK government’s CONTEST Strategy 
document (HM Government 2009) argued that ‘the current international terrorist threat is 
quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past’. Such political framings, 
alongside counter terrorism measures and initiatives such as pre-charge detention, 
extraordinary rendition, control orders and so on, leant themselves towards being understood 
in terms of exceptionalism. 
 
Ideas and debates around exceptionalism demarcate a distinction between “normal” politics 
and security politics. Many contributions to this debate engage with, in some form, Schmitt 
(1985) and/or Agamben (2004). For the former, Schmitt’s discussion is around the limits of 
the exercise of political power, focusing on the sovereign as that which decides the exception. 
Agamben’s work focuses more on the ways in which the exception has become the norm, 
such that individuals have lost the protection of law and are reduced to “bare life”. In the post 
9/11 context, exceptionalism became a common way to understand counter terrorism policies 
(for example, see Aradau and van Munster 2009; Huysmans 2004, 2008; Neal 2010). The 
binary between “exceptional” and “normal” politics will be returned to below, but prior to 
that, it is important to unpack and question exactly what we mean by exceptionalism. Whilst 
much attention is focused on the Schmittean decision as to what constitutes the exception, as 
Best (2017) points out, this is only one element of exceptional politics. Suspending the norm, 
where normal processes of law are derogated from, and putting the exception into practice 
(often through legislation, see Neal 2012) are, Best argues, key components of exceptional 
politics. Huysmans (2004) also points to exceptionalism as having important dimensions in 
terms of compressing the time taken to decide on policy and on the way in which “the 
people” are invoked and positioned. Such a range of exceptional practices reflects a desire to 
think about exceptionalism beyond a simply exceptional/normal binary. Indeed, Huysmans 
(2004, 330) talks about ‘varieties of exceptionalism’ (see also Neal 2012). 
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Exceptionalism is an important concept for the securitisation literature. Huysmans (2011, 
375), for instance, points to the connections between securitisation and debates around 
exceptionalism. 
 
Exceptionalist politics… draws a sharp distinction between the routine, alienation, 
reiteration of the everyday and the decisiveness and creativity of the moments of 
exception – the moments of existential threat. Speech acts of security enact a sharp 
distinction between the exceptional and the banal, the political and the everyday, the 
routine and creative. 
 
Securitisation most closely associated with the Copenhagen School has for many years, in its 
classical form, suggested that when “security” is spoken of, when, that is, an issue becomes 
securitised, it is removed from the realm of “normal” politics and is dealt with in a different 
political mode. This entails a move which ‘takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et 
al. 1998, 23). This move involves a speech act, which delineates the issue as an existential 
threat, requiring emergency action or special measures. Buzan et al. (1998, 29 emphasis 
added) stress that securitisation sees efforts to ‘present an issue as urgent and existential, so 
important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt 
with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues’. The effect of this is to separate security 
politics from other policy areas, to the extent that models, concepts, and analytical 
frameworks which seek to explain the content and shape of other areas of policy are not seen 
to be relevant. The securitisation framework has been the subject of intense debate, 
commentary and criticism (see, inter alia, McSweeny 1998; Williams, 2003; Balzacq, 2005; 
Stritzle, 2007; McDonald, 2008), yet the central point here is the argument that securitisation 
creates a sharp divide between “normal” and “securitised” politics.  
 
The cumulative effect of these positions is to place terrorism and counter terrorism policy as 
above or beyond the normal run of (British) politics. In this separation, broader debates about 
the content and direction of public policy as a whole – explaining the trajectories of public 
policy – are analytically excluded. Security is explained, in such accounts, through sovereign 
(or executive) will and is not related to other areas of public policy as it is seen to be 
exceptional, or at least different. If security politics is different or “exceptional” then we 
cannot or should not seek to explain them in the ways we might explain other areas of public 
policy. Our explanations revolve around executive will, albeit in different ways, with the 
literature focusing on executive action being a related, but different argument to those which 
orientate around sovereign exceptionalism. 
 
Beyond the exception  
 
In some ways, the reason as to why security politics has come to be associated with executive 
decisionism is partly related to academic disciplinary conventions. As Andrew Neal (2012) 
has pointed out, political science has rarely engaged with security issues, leaving these to IR 
scholars in the main, with the result that there has been little dialogue between political 
science and IR in terms of the politics of security. The effect the security studies/IR 
dominance of counter terrorism and mainstream political science’s neglect of such issues has 
been to push security issues into a different academic space beyond that which analyses 
“normal” politics. In effect this produces a disciplinary exceptionalisation of security politics 
which serves to render it isolated and cut off from broader political dynamics and concerns in 
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political science, and British politics more specifically (see Neal forthcoming). Neal’s work, 
which has focused on the ways in which Parliament has become a more active participant in 
security politics in recent years, is an important contribution to the debates about security 
politics and how they are framed, shaped and conducted. He has emphasised the ways in 
which terrorism studies (orthodox and critical) has tended to ignore or downplay the regular 
and iterative political aspects of counter terrorism. As Neal notes, the dominant tendency is to 
see counter terrorism in terms of the sovereign and the exception and therefore to picture 
security in existential, exceptional terms and dominated by the executive. This he argues 
‘creates an analytical blind spot regarding security politics and an incomplete picture of the 
workings of security’ (Neal 2012, 108). 
 
Similarly, the focus on sovereign decision making or exceptionality has been critiqued by 
those associated with the Paris School and International Political Sociology (IPS) more 
broadly. Scholars such as Bigo and Huysmans argue that security politics is not only decided 
or framed by (sovereign) political decision makers, but that a broader field of security 
professionals is also important in understanding what they refer to as the ‘management of 
unease’ (Bigo 2008, 64). Bigo (2014, 211) has critiqued the presentism and decisionism of 
securitisation theory, arguing that we need to take account of a broader context and ‘the 
everyday practices that enact a governmentality of fear and unease’. Similary, Huysmans 
(2011, 372) has argued for attention away from decisive moments of securitisation towards 
more recurrent and ongoing ‘little security nothings’. Huysmans argues that we should not 
simply focus on ‘critical decisions’, but also look to the ‘continuous process of assembling 
objects, subjects and practices’ (Huysmans 2011, 377) which make up the politics around 
(in)security. This broader field and the technology and technocratic processes associated with 
it, Huysmans argues, in important ways are prior to the decisions of elites; they ‘precede and 
pre-structure political framing in significant ways’ (Huysmans 2006, 8). Therefore, rather 
than focusing on the actions, or utterances of a smaller group of elites, those associated with 
the Paris School seek to draw attention to the wider, routinised, bureaucratic and technocratic 
ways in which security is governed. This field of security professionals, they argue, mobilise 
threats and promote unease through technological processes and self-interest (i.e. the 
maintenance of budgets for security measures). Political elites are frequently happy to concur, 
partly, Bigo (2002, 65, 70) argues to mask their inadequacies and failures in other political 
areas and to obscure their lack of power (or will?) in economic policymaking.  
 
Whilst as Andrew Neal (forthcoming) notes, the Paris school is critical of the focus on 
traditional political actors and their speech acts, it retains a sense in which security is separate 
from traditional politics. Its focus on the field of security professionals similarly supplants the 
institutions of democratic, normal politics. Indeed Bigo asserts that whilst politicians play 
important roles in security, security professionals occupy a privileged and, in some instances, 
even a dominant position. ‘Even if national professionals of politics still play a key role in 
structuring security issues… the agencies and bureaus that comprise the world of security are 
arguably the sole agents able to assert… their definition of what inspires unease’ (Bigo 2008, 
27). 
 
A number of other scholars have further disputed exceptionalist readings of security politics. 
Whilst there may be exceptional elements of counter terrorism politics (Guantanamo Bay and 
extraordinary rendition projects represent perhaps the clearest sense of sovereign 
exceptionalism), as a number of scholars have argued, a focus on these risks downplaying or 
ignoring the more regular, mundane even, aspects of counter terrorism politics. Neocleous 
(2006, 207) forcefully makes the argument that the opposition between emergency/exception 
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and normal law is fallacious ‘historical evidence suggests that emergency powers are far from 
exceptional; rather, they are an ongoing aspect of normal political rule’. He further states ‘In 
other words, it is through law that violent actions conducted in “emergency conditions” have 
been legitimated’ (Neocleous 2006, 206). Boukalas (2014, 116-117) similarly argues, when 
discussing the response of the Bush administration to 9/11 that counter terrorism law 
 
is a juridical and political denial of decisionism and of the assumption of all powers 
by a single entity taking over in the exception. Instead, the “sovereign” seeks to draw 
draconian, discretionary power from law and inscribe it into law and to do so through 
the active involvement of the legislature and, occasionally, the judiciary. 
 
In the remaining sections of the paper, it will be argued that analyses of counter terrorism 
politics should move away from a reliance on ideas of sovereign will or exceptionalism (at 
least in terms of a simple exceptional/normal binary) – indeed perhaps moving beyond the 
question of who makes security politics. The contribution the article seeks to make is to 
explore what might be gained by thinking through counter terrorism politics and policy with 
lenses and debates from “normal” politics. The paper seeks to do this through bringing 
counter terrorism politics closer to the study of “normal” politics and focusing on why 
counter terrorism takes the form that it does. The majority of the paper is explicitly located 
within the British context, although some of the analysis ranges more widely. The reason for 
focussing on British politics is a relatively straightforward one. Britain has proved to be 
remarkably active in terms of terrorism and counter terrorism policy (Jarvis and Lister 2015). 
Whilst the UK is by no means alone in pursuing new counter terrorism powers, it does 
represent something of a “market leader” and a number of countries, such as Australia, have 
been influenced by the UK approach (Roach 2011). There is, in simple terms, a lot of 
“politics” to examine in British counter terrorism policy.  
 
In “bringing the politics back in” to the study of British counter terrorism policy, the paper 
focuses on two prominent debates within British politics, namely those around 
depoliticisation, and neoliberalism. These debates cover questions of governance, governing 
strategies and political economy – areas sometimes left out of (mainly IR-based) analyses of 
terrorism and counter terrorism policy. Depoliticisation has been described by Flinders and 
Wood (2014a, 135) as the ‘dominant model of statecraft in the twenty first century’. It is, 
therefore, a central concept in contemporary political science in Britain and beyond. 
Neoliberalism might seem a less obvious choice. Neoliberalism, has become, as Schmidt 
notes, fundamental to many western states, yet until the financial crisis, perhaps its centrality 
had gone if not unacknowledged, then perhaps somewhat downplayed. Yet she argues that 
neoliberalism constitutes the ‘“background ideas” in contemporary capitalist democracies’ 
(Schmidt 2016, 319). Since the financial crisis, the prominence and role of neoliberalism has 
come to the fore once again. Indeed, the rise of austerity politics and the resilience of 
neoliberalism in the face of the financial crisis has led some to analyse the more disciplinary 
or punitive elements of neoliberalism; witness debates about “authoritarian neoliberalism” 
(Bruff 2014, Tansel 2017).  
 
The Politics of Counter Terrorism: securitised, normal, exceptional or other? 
 
Roe (2012, 251) suggests that “normal” politics, to which securitised politics is to be 
counterposed, represents politics which follows established rules and procedures; a politics 
which ‘operates according to established mechanisms. Proposed measures are marked by 
debate and deliberation. Decisionmaking is open in the sense that legislatures and other 
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bodies are able to scrutinise the executive’. Yet, as we shall see below, there is a parallel 
debate in (British) political science, namely that around depoliticisation, which suggests that 
such modes of politics are becoming increasingly rare across the board. If state actors are 
increasingly drawn to depoliticised modes of governance, which abjures many of the 
characteristics of “normal” politics identified by Roe, what is special about security? Or, 
intriguingly, is security different, but not in the manner characterised by securitisation – is 
security the area marked by contestation, debate and discussion in a (British) political arena 
increasingly characterised by depoliticisation? 
 
These debates have a relatively long genesis. Hay argues that the perceived crisis of the 
1970s and arguments about “overload” and “ungovernability” (compare King, 1975; Rose, 
1979 and Parsons 1982) led to a perception that government could not function effectively 
when trying to achieve a wide range of policy goals. From this, allied to public choice theory 
and neo-liberal ideas, came a sense in which the state should seek to do less. As Hay (2006, 
57) argues such accounts suggested that: 
 
A bloated state had simply taken on too much by sanctioning ever spiralling 
expectations and siphoning off an ever growing share of national output through 
taxation receipts in the attempt to satisfy such expectations. It argued that what we 
needed was rather less “politics”… and rather less “public sector”.  
 
Hay goes on to argue that under the influence of such accounts, depoliticisation has become a 
prominent aspect of British politics (Flinders and Wood 2014a). Interestingly, Hay identifies 
some accounts of depoliticisation which makes it seem rather similar to securitisation. He 
cites Burnham’s early definition, that depoliticisation is ‘the process of placing at one remove 
the political character of decision making’ (Burnham, in Hay 2006, 92). Hay goes on to 
characterise depoliticisation as something which removes decisions about political goods and 
policies away from public deliberation, something which elites find useful to do, especially if 
the policy is contentious and/or unpopular. Flinders and Wood (2014b, 155) suggest that 
depoliticisation has three “faces”; governmental, societal and discursive. Governmental 
depoliticisation represents things like governments putting decision making processes at a 
remove from political institutions. Paradigmatic examples of this include the granting of 
independence to the Bank of England over monetary policy and a range of institutional 
developments which removed certain decisions from overtly political attribution towards 
more bureaucratic/technocratic institutions (examples include the creations of NHS 
Foundation Trusts, academies in the school system, the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) on health policy, the Independent Police Complaints Authority and the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council on law and order issues (Flinders and Buller 2006)). In 
making the case for societal and discursive depoliticisation, Flinders and Wood aim to 
suggest that it is not simply a governmental strategy, but one that occurs and exists across a 
range of processes, institutions and arenas. Societal depoliticisation occurs when issues are 
not considered to be political or ‘the existence of choices concerning that issue are no longer 
debated’ (Harder cited in Flinders and Wood 2014b, 159). Discursive depoliticisation 
involves ‘the promotion of an issue, but alongside a single interpretation and the denial of 
choice’ (Flinders and Wood, 2014b, 161). An example of such discursive depoliticisation 
might be seen to be ideas about the necessity of austerity policies in the wake of the financial 
crisis (Standring 2018).  
 
This equation between depoliticisation and the closing down of options and debate is also 
emphasised by Jenkins (2011, 160) who argues: 
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a strategy of depoliticisation entails forming necessities, permanence, immobility, 
closure and fatalism and concealing/negating or removing contingency. To engage in 
a strategy of depoliticisation is also to perform a political act, as it generates the 
restriction, removal or suppression of our capacities for autonomy, as well as the 
preservation of a particular strategy or force. 
 
This all seems to bear at least a passing resemblance to securitisation theory (see Edkins 
1999), suggesting that security politics might not be an exceptional or different policy arena; 
that, in other words, the dynamics to which securitisation theory appeals to, and cites as 
specific to the field of security, may be far more diffuse and widespread than that theory 
allows for. Indeed, Flinders and Wood (2014a, 143) ponder whether depoliticisation creates 
‘a situation more akin to exception as the rule’. Discussing the work of Schmitt and 
Agamben, they note the ways in which 
 
depoliticised modes of governance have mutated from being used provisionally and 
exceptionally to becoming a ‘technique of government’ which had, as a consequence, 
made it harder for citizens to challenge the authority of the state. (ibid.)  
 
It is important to note, as Forster et al. (2014, 229) argue that depoliticisation, at least when 
employed at the governmental level, is not literally the removal or absence of politics, but 
rather a very specific tactic to absent and deny responsibility and blame: ‘what gets 
“squeezed out” by de-politicisation, is not politics per se, but rather the responsibility, blame, 
costs and discretion associated with policy making’. It is striking to note the contrast with 
counter terrorism policy, where government directly assumes responsibility and costs for the 
policy (albeit with some “at one remove” policy adjustments (e.g. Prevent statutory duty) – a 
point to which I will return below). 
 
What, therefore, does the debate about depoliticisation offer to analyses and understandings 
of UK counter terrorism policy? At first glance, it appears that depoliticisation offers little by 
way of enhancement – it looks similar to securitisation, in that the main thrust of 
depoliticisation is that governmental or political decisions are increasingly being removed 
from “normal” politics and being subject to different, elite-driven and unaccountable 
processes (although there are differences between the two theories. See Neal forthcoming). 
Yet, the depoliticisation literature would suggest that this process is increasingly apparent 
across governmental policy areas, and not just something that happens for security issues. It 
therefore further leads to scepticism about the distinctiveness of security politics – if many 
policy areas are increasingly being removed from “normal” politics, what is special about 
security politics? Or, to put it another way, does “normal” politics increasingly look like 
securitised politics? 
 
However, one might even push the argument a stage further. Brief examinations of some 
aspects of counter terrorism policy and politics are suggestive of a very different kind of 
politics to that imagined in depoliticisation/securitisation accounts. Instead of security politics 
being distinctive for being closed, and elite driven – depoliticised perhaps – UK counter 
terrorism politics sometimes looks akin to “normal” politics, with open, public contestation, 
deliberation and debate. Indeed, if we focus solely on the governmental level, there is little 
evidence of the issue being moved from central government and counter terrorism policy 
does not appear to be a deracinated, thin, bureaucratic kind of politics with little or no 
contestation or debate. 
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The account of the passage of the 2006 Terrorism Act (admittedly a single piece of 
legislation, albeit an important one, following the 7/7 attacks) serves as an example. The 
process of drafting the bill involved cross party discussions, the government was defeated in 
Parliament on a key area of the bill, there were allegations that the police had been 
“politicised” in the way in which they argued in favour of the bill, it was not fast-tracked 
through Parliament and received something akin to “normal” Parliamentary time and 
procedures. Whilst some campaigners such as Liberty argued that the legislation was rushed, 
the overall time from publication of the bill to royal assent, at some seven months, is 
(roughly) comparable with other legislation. (The recent Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 
of 2013, went from publication to royal assent in seven months (Parliament UK, n.d. a), the 
2010 Academies Act (increasing the devolution of schools to academy status) went from first 
reading to royal assent in two months (Parliament UK, n.d. b). As a further point of 
comparison, the committee stage for the 2006 Terrorism Act lasted for around twelve and a 
half hours (Hansard, 2005) and for the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, the same stage 
lasted around ten and a half hours (Hansard, 2013)). Indeed, a recent Parliamentary Report 
(House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, 2009) looked into so-called “fast-
tracking” of legislation (i.e. reducing amount of Parliamentary time for debate) and found 
that of the 49 pieces are considered, only 5 are counter terrorism measures. Moreover, major 
pieces of counter terrorism legislation, that introduced controversial measures such as stop-
and-search without suspicion (Terrorism Act 2000); extension of pre-charge detention to 28 
days (Terrorism Act 2006), Control Orders (Counter Terrorism Act 2005) do not appear on 
this list. 
 
The legislation is subject to annual review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, where the aim is ‘to inform – so far as is possible within the necessary 
constraints of secrecy – the parliamentary and public debate over anti-terrorism powers and 
civil liberties in the UK’ (Anderson, 2015, 3, emphasis added). It has also been the subject of 
a number of Parliamentary committee reports (e.g. House of Commons 2018), and the subject 
of various social movement campaigns including Liberty (Russell, 2010), Haldane Society of 
Socialist Lawyers (n.d.) and the Church of England (n.d.) to pick just three. Finally, it should 
be noted, that the 2012 Protection of Freedoms Act reversed one aspect of the 2006 Terrorism 
Act, reducing the maximum pre-charge detention period to 14 days. This was, in part, due to 
the change of administration from Labour to a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition. 
There is, in sum, a great deal of “normal” politics here. This brief sketch is consonant with 
more systematic analysis which emphasises that security politics is often subject to consistent 
and significant debate and contestation (Wagner et al. 2017; Bright 2015) 
 
Whilst it perhaps looks like counter terrorism policy is not depoliticised, is it the case that it is 
exceptional? Here the picture is more mixed. As noted above, we can think about 
exceptionalism in a number of different ways. In terms of the content of policy, moving to a 
situation where those suspected of terrorist offences could be detained pre-charge for up to 28 
days represents a significant deviation from the norm, both compared to prior UK law and to 
other countries. Yet the process, and the time spent over this do not look “exceptional”. 
Indeed, to echo Boukalas’ argument above, when the UK government has sought 
“exceptional” powers, it has more often than not, cleaved to the Parliamentary system and 
process to provide justification and legitimation. In sum the argument is twofold; on the one 
hand, there seems no lack of politics or contestation around counter terrorism policy. On the 
other hand, whilst counter terrorism policy might sometimes be considered exceptional or 
deviating from or suspending the norm, such changes are not normally enacted through 
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exceptional means. In other words, there might be elements of exceptionalism but they are 
delivered through “normal” political procedures and processes. As Bigo (2008, 36) puts it 
‘Exception works hand in hand with liberalism and gives the key to understanding its normal 
functioning’. This is a point that will be returned to below. 
 
This leads to an intriguing proposition – and given the lack of systematic examination, it can 
only be a proposition – namely, that UK counter terrorism politics is perhaps somewhat 
distinctive, but not in the ways in which securitisation might imagine. Might it be the case 
that UK counter terrorism politics represents a form of “normal” politicised politics in an era 
where this applies to increasingly few policy areas? This is a point that Huysmans alludes to. 
He argues that if the speech act of security creates a rupture of the kind which states that the 
radical nature of the threat means that traditional responses are inadequate – invoking, in 
other words, an exception – then the response to this might be a radically political one. If the 
old way of doing things is to be cast aside, all sorts of ‘rupturing’ options and possibilities are 
implied (even if they are not acted upon) such that we might refer to ‘the speech act of 
security being radically politicizing’ (Huysmans 2011, 374). 
 
If this is the case, and counter terrorism rather than being depoliticised is, in fact, a politicised 
area of policy (in a context of ever more depoliticisation), how might we explain the apparent 
paradox? The argument to be developed below is that part of the answer may lie in the 
centrality that counter terrorism politics has assumed in the UK, something which is in part 
due to the state’s retreat in other areas, itself related to the influence of neoliberal ideas. 
Counter terrorism may appear as “normal” politics because of the centrality of its 
performance to the very essence of state-ness. The state cannot afford to elide or hide counter 
terrorism as an important part of its role is an ostentatious display of the state performing its 
key roles. 
 
There is perhaps one important caveat to note here. The above focuses on the national 
political debate, often within Parliament. Whilst it might be argued that counter terrorism 
politics at this level appears vibrant and not depoliticised, that this does not mean that counter 
terrorism does not have depoliticising effects – particularly if examining levels beyond the 
national/Parliamentary debate. For instance, Prevent, in its present form, invites doctors, 
nurses and teachers among others, to identify and refer those who may be subject to 
radicalisation. An important part of basic training provided to such personnel emphasises that 
they do not have to be sure or know for certain that the individual(s) in question are radical or 
in danger of becoming radicalised – they just have to refer the case on. Heath-Kelly (2017, 
39) examines the Prevent training provided to NHS staff and concludes that ‘the purpose of 
the training is to induce a culture of reporting’. This might tally with societal or discursive 
depoliticisation noted above, attempting to remove calculations, evaluations and alternatives 
from the responsible individuals – don’t think, just refer seems to be the mantra. It may 
therefore be that depoliticisation is manifest around counter terrorism, but not necessarily at 
the (national) governmental level.  
 
Neoliberalism  
 
As noted above, depoliticisation has its roots, Hay (2006, 99) argues, in a confluence of 
public choice theory and neoliberalism, both of which ‘have considerable trouble in 
conceiving of the state as either an effective or an honest guarantor of the public good’. 
Flinders and Wood (2014a, 137) similarly identify depoliticisation in terms of ‘the gradual 
marginalisation or closing down of democratic governance, due to the paradigmatic influence 
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of neoliberalism’s antipathy towards the state and its deification of the market’ (see also 
Forster et al, 2014). There seems, in other words, a connection between depoliticisation and 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is, as Jessop (2013, 65) notes, a ‘chaotic concept’, whilst 
Wacquant (2012, 68) refers to neoliberalism as ‘slippery, hazy and contentious’. At its 
loosest, it is a concept which refers to the mechanisms by which market primacy has been 
extended beyond the economic realm, into social, political and other areas (Harvey 2005). 
British politics’ engagement with neoliberalism has frequently come through the lens and 
experience of Thatcherism and its legacy, which will be examined in detail below. This 
section will consider whether debates around neoliberalism and its character have purchase or 
insights for counter terrorism, arguing that the retreat from or rolling back of many of the 
state’s traditional roles, particularly in the economic realm, has produced, in turn, a 
heightened attention to and focus on security related issues. Whilst the expansion of counter 
terrorism, through policies such as Prevent, therefore initially seem to be unrelated to 
neoliberal ideas and processes, the paper wishes to argue that there is a much closer 
relationship than seems at first apparent.  
 
After tracing some of the more explicit connections between neoliberalism, terrorism and 
coercion, the article turns to consider the work of Loic Wacquant, who argues that an upsurge 
in coercion and control has accompanied the relinquishing and relaxing of economic controls. 
In part, this seeming paradox (more control/coercion and less control/coercion) is explained 
by Wacquant as a necessary part of neoliberalism – to control and mask its shortcomings. In 
other words, greater punitive, coercive security measures are a “normal” part (maybe even a 
necessary part) of the functioning of neoliberal regimes. The article further builds on this 
account of greater coercive security politics (such as counter terrorism) by revisiting Stuart 
Hall’s work on Thatcherism and authoritarian populism. Hall’s work facilitates a deeper 
understanding of how such increased attention to security a) becomes possible and b) how it 
“resolves” or displaces the tensions within neoliberalism. In Hall’s work, we find an account 
of how in the “normal” run of neoliberal politics, social, political and economic crises are 
displaced into moral panics. These moral panics, and the populist consent mobilised 
alongside them, are given “false” resolutions which provide an element of reassurance and 
deflection from wider, deeper social, political and economic crises prompted by 
neoliberalism itself. Thus the spectacle of security masks the deeper rooted insecurities 
created by neoliberalism. 
 
At first glance, neoliberalism doesn’t seem to be able to explain much about counter 
terrorism; if anything, the post 9/11 drive around counter terrorism seems to be in conflict 
with neoliberal principles of a limited state and individual freedoms. However, a number of 
scholars have identified a link between (counter) terrorism, neoliberalism and its less liberal 
and more coercive or punitive aspects (see inter alia Giroux 2005; Stokes 2005; Blakeley 
2009; Heath Kelly et al. 2015), often focusing on the direct ways in which terror/counter 
terrorism was productive in the expansion of neoliberalisation in the global south. Durodie 
(2007), although in slightly different terms, also points to the relationship between a 
(neoliberal) style of government which abjures many traditional roles and values and a 
fascination with security and terrorism. He argues that the proliferation of risk management 
techniques and ideas has resulted in an almost neurotic society, but one which also lacks a 
sense of political purpose or vision. Into this political or ideological void, government and 
state actors eagerly embrace a role as providers of security as it gives them a purpose and 
position: 
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the politics of fear, or risk regulation, have provided a hesitant and isolated elite with 
an agenda and a new, if limited, sense of moral purpose. The authorities have 
willingly embraced this role. Latching onto the general climate of isolation and 
insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage themselves as societal risk managers 
(Durodie 2007, 441). 
 
As noted above, those associated with the Paris School and IPS move in the direction of 
noting links between neoliberalism and the governmentality of fear and unease. Bigo argues 
that the field of security professionals, in concert with political elites manage a politics of 
unease and fear through technology and technocratic solutions, but they do so in such a way 
as to support and be productive for economic concerns. Focusing on the unease and 
securitisation of migration, he argues that such unease is managed, manufactured and even 
created to be useful for a wider political and economic context 
 
The securitization of migration is, thus… used as a mode of governmentality by 
diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does not yet exist, 
so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security and to mask some of 
their failures (Bigo 2002, 65) 
 
Bigo goes on to note that this emphasis on security and border control is seen as important by 
political elites, as their influence and control in other areas is less apparent. ‘This assumption 
[of control over borders] is now even more important for them given that they know they 
have less and less importance in decision making concerning money and credit’ (Bigo 2002, 
70). 
 
A similarly Bourdieusian inspired analysis extends this line of argumentation. The work of 
Loic Wacquant is suggestive of a connection between neoliberalism and security and counter 
terrorism. Wacquant focuses mostly on the American case, but also sees America as ‘the 
premier global exporter of “theories,” slogans, and measures on the crime and safety front’ 
(Wacquant 2008, 21), and sees the UK as particularly receptive to such ideas. He has 
emphasised how the “rolling back of the state” from redistributive social policies under 
neoliberalism, goes hand in hand with the expansion of a more extensive penal/criminal 
justice system: 
 
policies of economic deregulation, supervisory workfare and punitive criminal justice 
tend to trek and blossom together. In sum, the penalisation of poverty emerged as a 
core element of the domestic implementation and transborder diffusion of the 
neoliberal project, the ‘iron fist’ of the penal state mating with the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market in conjunction with the fraying of the social safety net. (Wacquant 2012, 
67) 
 
In this, Wacquant sees neoliberalism as a political project, one that seeks to utilise the power 
of the state to reshape citizens to forms amenable to the market. It is, he argues ‘an 
articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the 
second onto the third’ (Wacquant 2012, 71). In this, the state is not so much dismantled as it 
is reengineered. Neoliberalism ‘wishes to reform and refocus the state so as to actively foster 
and bolster the market as an ongoing political creation’ (Wacquant 2012, 72). This 
reformulation of the state occurs for Wacquant for two reasons, one more fully explored than 
the other. The first, as suggested in the passages above, is that the expansion of the penal state 
is a solution to the answer of what to do with those dislocated and “left behind” by neoliberal 
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capitalism. Wacquant (2010, 211) argues that neoliberalism expands the punitive/coercive 
field in order to deal with the fall out from greater economic inequality and insecurity.  
 
A second explanation of this twin move is clearly stated by Wacquant, although perhaps not 
as fully explored as the first. Echoing Bigo’s point above, as well as serving to regulate and 
police the marginal populations in neoliberal societies, an enhanced and expanded state focus 
on law and order serve to cover and distract from the absence of state regulation, power and 
influence in other areas. The increased attention given to law and order issues, in the penal 
state ‘shore up the deficit of legitimacy suffered by political decision-makers, owing to the 
very fact that they have abjured the established missions of the state on the social and 
economic fronts’ (Wacquant 2008, 27). In other words, the focus on law and order and 
security serves as a bait and switch for the (deeper?) socio-economic forms of inequality (and 
resultant insecurity). Putting these two strands together, it might be suggested that what 
Wacquant is arguing is that the neoliberal state, unwilling to fundamentally alter market 
based accumulation, and thus powerless to assuage its citizens concerns and insecurities 
about their (material) well-being, stages a ‘garish spectacle of law-and-order pornography’ to 
provide a semblance of security so as to ‘reaffirm the authority of a government wanting in 
legitimacy due to having forsaken its established duties of social and economic protection’ 
(Wacquant 2014, 1695). This performance of the Leviathan-function is seen by Wacquant 
(2014, 1701, original emphasis) as ‘a bureaucratic theatre geared to reaffirming their 
authority and to staging the ‘sovereignty’ of the state’ and the ‘ritual reassertion of the 
sovereignty of the state’ (2010, 208).  
 
There are echoes here of Weber’s (1998, 92) arguments, using the work of Butler, concerning 
the performativity of states, where the state is denied its pre-given existence and rather is seen 
as the outcome of its various actions, performances: ‘the identity of the state – the ways we 
understand this materiality of people, territory, government etc. – does not pre-exist 
performative expression of the state’ (see also Jessop 2008). Interestingly, Weber’s 
discussion is framed around sovereignty, and she argues that such performativity (of 
sovereignty) often take strongest form at the moments when the state appears to be least 
sovereign, taking place when ‘states traumatically confront the impossibility of “being” 
sovereign and thus insist upon their sovereign subjectivity all the more’ (Weber 1998, 92). 
Thus what occurs is ‘the proliferation of performances at the very moments when 
representation seems to fail’ (Weber 1998, 92-3). Therefore, this perhaps echoes the points 
Wacquant makes about the failure of the state to provide (or be willing to try to provide) or 
address the broader socio-economic insecurities of its citizens. This leads to a performance, a 
‘staging of the sovereignty of the state’, in order to shore up legitimacy perhaps, but also to 
render the state concrete and actual; to do, and to be seen to be doing, something, in an era of 
limited governmental intervention, especially in economic governance. Clearly, to make this 
point is not to suggest that counter terrorism is the only, or main, form in which such 
performances are enacted – merely that this may be a hitherto underplayed aspect in the 
construction of counter terrorism governance. 
 
To this it is tempting to add that as such moves or performances can never be complete, they 
perhaps feed a desire among citizens for ever greater law and order/security measures (a 
desire, which if Wacquant is right, can never be met through such policies). In this, Wacquant 
perhaps offers an interesting twist on Tilly’s conception of the state as a protection racket. 
Tilly (2002) draws a distinction between racketeers (who cause the threat and offer protection 
from it, for a price) and legitimate protectors, who offer genuine, if uncertain, protection. The 
state, under the terms above, is a deviant form of both – it creates (some) insecurities 
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(through neoliberalism and, in particular, resultant wage/labour insecurities) but offers (again 
in Wacquant’s terms) a diversionary, illusory, performance of security. 
 
It should be noted that Wacquant’s work is not without its problems. There is, as Wimmer 
(2014) argues some conceptual confusion as to whether the relationship between welfare & 
the penal state and neoliberal governance is contingent or functional. Wacquant’s broader 
conceptual framework emphasises Bourdieu’s concept of a bureaucratic field, under which 
the state is treated not as a “thing” but as an outcome of social relations, political forces, 
struggle and so on (Wacquant 2010. See also Jessop 2008). This suggests that the outcomes 
of the state are the contingent and uncertain outcomes of specific institutional terrains and 
actors. Yet elsewhere, Wacquant refers to a much more tightly specified relationship: ‘there 
exists a deep structural and functional connection between market rule and punishment after 
the close of the Keynesian-Fordist era’ (Wacquant 2012, 76). There is therefore an ambiguity 
around whether the co-developments that Wacquant points to are functional derivations of 
neoliberalism or more contingent processes arrived at by state (and non-state) actors working 
within and under neoliberal institutions and ideas. 
 
Yet the analysis above offers a potentially fruitful avenue of exploration for scholars of 
counter terrorism. Can counter terrorism policies be understood as extensions of the penal 
state which Wacquant describes? Whilst it might be considered a stretch to view counter 
terrorism as a means for “mopping up” the dispossessed, does Wacquant’s second 
explanation for the expansion of the punitive state offer a way of thinking about the form and 
priority that security and counter terrorism are given within the British state? What 
Wacquant’s work suggests is a much deeper connection between security, economic and 
social policy such that to think of them as belonging to, and being constituted within, separate 
political realms or areas, is difficult to reconcile. If Wacquant’s work has any purchase in 
explaining counter terrorism in the UK, it more strongly suggests deep connections (whether 
functional or contingent) between security and other policy areas. Such a move involves, or 
necessitates a de-exceptionalisation of security politics in the sense of security politics being 
something apart or away from other elements of politics. It also raises the above question of 
how one reconciles the contingent and functional elements of Wacquant’s account. One 
potential resolution to this is to examine the work of Stuart Hall and ideas around 
authoritarian populism. 
 
Legacy of Thatcherism  
 
Wacquant is not the first author to examine the ways in which economic (neo)liberalism has 
been combined with more authoritarian tendencies. Debates around Thatcherism focussed 
attention on the ways in which broadly neoliberal-inspired projects such as Thatcherism, 
combined economic liberalism with strong authoritarian elements (see Hall, 1979; 1985 
Jessop et al., 1984; Gamble, 1988). Gamble’s famous conjunction of “free economy/strong 
state” is prominent amongst these. Gamble (1988, 28) argues that Thatcherism’s particular 
combination of conservative and liberal new right leads to a paradox whereby the state is 
simultaneously ‘rolled back and rolled forward’. Markets are to be liberalised whereas the 
force of the state is to be redoubled in addressing and supporting traditional social and moral 
strictures and institutions. In Germany the concept of ordoliberalism has considered such 
constellations (Bonefeld, 2012). Neocleous (2006) also notes the ways in which authoritarian 
or strong law and order impulses lie at the very heart of liberal states. He argues that the 
history of “emergency” powers suggests that they are not only resorted to during times of 
(military) crisis, but constitute a more “normal” form of political control. 
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In this area, the work of Stuart Hall is particularly important. Hall’s work on Thatcherism is 
probably most remembered for the concept of “authoritarian populism”, which referred to the 
ways in which the Thatcherite project sought to construct a hegemonic project through an 
apparently contradictory melding of authoritarian impulses based on appeals to populist 
concerns (Hall 1979, 1985. See also Jessop et al. 1984; Gamble, 1988). Hall considered the 
shift to a state and society where coercion is more pronounced, particularly examining the 
ways in which moral panics functioned ‘to win for the authoritarian closure the gloss of 
populist consent’ (Hall 1985, 116). Thus, in Hall’s work, we might find analytical tools 
which explain how neoliberal states stage spectacles of security to assuage or distract from 
insecurities generated by neoliberalism, which add to the analysis of Wacquant and others 
above.  
 
The classic Policing the Crisis (Hall et al, 1978) contains a number of reflections on the 
“moral panic” in response to muggings in the 1970s. It is worth here citing a passage at 
length 
 
Why does society react to “mugging” as it does, when it does? To what exactly, is this 
a reaction?... Why is Britain in a moral tail-spin about “crime” in the early 1970s? 
Why is the “control culture” so sensitised and mobilised against a potential 
“mugging” threat, and why does this prior sensitisation occur against such a 
distinctive social and ethnic group in the community? Why does the very idea of 
“mugging” trigger off such profound social fears and anxieties in the general public 
and the press? In short what is the repressed social and historical content of 
“mugging” and the response to it?... Perhaps the most immediately troubling feature is 
the clear discrepancy between the scale of the “threat” – even on the basis of official 
estimates – and the scale of the measures taken to prevent and constrain it. (Hall et al. 
1978, 184) 
 
If we were to substitute the words “mugging”, “crime” and “1970s” for “terrorism” and 
“2000s”, this would seem to be an apt, current and vital series of questions to consider. Hall 
et al. contend that when the relationship between crime or criminality enters a phase where 
either criminality looks different and/or when state responses to this are heightened, that this 
speaks to broader socio-political fundamentals. There are periods where a rough equilibrium 
exists between crime and law and order policy, which Hall et al. (1978, 186) refer to as the 
‘“normalised repression” of the state’. This is contrasted with periods where such balance is 
absent. For Hall et al. such periods, where state repression is heightened frequently coincide 
with a wider context of social upheaval and economic crisis. These upheavals, Hall et al. 
(1978, 217) go on to explain, are when hegemony breaks down, when ‘the whole basis of 
political leadership and cultural authority becomes exposed and contested’. When this takes 
place, processes of assuring rule through consent give way to greater emphasis on coercive 
control or ‘repertoires of domination’. Importantly, Hall et al. (1978, 217, original emphasis) 
do not see such moments in purely exceptional terms, but as extensions or intensifications of 
“normal” politics: 
 
It is important to note that this does not entail a suspension of the “normal” exercise 
of state power – it is not a move to what is sometimes called a fully exceptional form 
of the state. It is better understood as - to put it paradoxically – an “exceptional 
moment” in the “normal” form of the late capitalist state. What makes it “exceptional” 
is the increased reliance on coercive mechanisms and apparatuses already available 
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within the normal repertoire of state power, and the powerful orchestration, in support 
of this tilt of the balance towards the coercive pole, of an authoritarian consensus 
 
They conclude that at such moments the fundamentals of coercion and force upon which the 
state and its authority rest, are revealed. This discussion links to the earlier one concerning 
exceptionalism and in particular, the point developed by a number of scholars that we should 
resist a simple exceptional/normal binary. The exceptional tendencies to which Hall et al. 
appeal are similar to those invoked above, such as the tendency for exceptionalism to work in 
and through normal institutions and processes and that of Huysmans (2004), and the 
argument that one aspect of exceptionalism is the way in which populism is invoked. 
 
This work was later to coalesce around the concept of authoritarian populism.  The crisis to 
which they refer is the ending of the post-war settlement from the end of the 1960s onwards. 
The purpose of such a shift is to contain the ‘conjunctural crisis’, the larger, more 
fundamental crisis, by way of a “moral panic”, which displaces larger questions and 
concerns. Moral panics were, for Hall et al. crucial in mobilising support for enhanced 
coercion and control. Once again, the parallels between the characterisation of a “moral 
panic” and the present counter terrorism milieu is striking: 
 
Their typical form is that of a dramatic event which focuses and triggers a local 
response and public disquiet. Often as a result of local organising and moral 
entrepreneurship, the wider powers of the control culture are both alerted (the media 
play a crucial role here) and mobilised (the police, the courts). The issue is then seen 
as “symptomatic” of wider, more troubling but less concrete themes. 
 
Thus, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 are seen not as criminal acts, perpetrated by a group 
of individuals but as symptomatic of firstly the problematic engagement and assimilation of 
the Muslim community in the UK, and more broadly, as evidence of the failure of 
multiculturalism in the UK. David Cameron’s infamous Munich speech is a prominent 
example. Cameron decried the way in which ‘state multiculturalism’ had ‘encouraged 
different cultures to live separate lives’ which ‘leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless’ 
such that ‘they don’t turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see… is a process of 
radicalisation’ (Cameron, 2011).  
 
Perhaps addressing some of the concerns discussed in terms of Wacquant’s work about how 
contingent relationships between economy and coercion are, for Hall et al. the 
implementation of coercion rests on mobilising consent. This is a contingent construction, 
carried out by what Hall et al. (1978, 221) refer to as ‘signification spirals’. They argue that a 
signification spiral is a way of presenting and discussing events which inherently increases 
the sense of their threatening nature. They suggest they contain the following elements: 
 
 (1) the identification of a specific issue of concern; 
(2) the identification of a subversive minority; 
(3) “convergence”, or the linking, by labelling, of this specific issue to other 
problems; 
(4) the notion of “thresholds” which, once crossed, can lead to an escalating threat; 
(5) the prophesy of more troubling times to come if no action is taken… 
(6) the call for “firm steps” (Hall et al., 1978, 223) 
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It is fairly straightforward to argue that all six steps are present in the post 9/11 concerns 
around terrorism. Hall et al. (1978) pay particular attention to “convergence”, the process by 
which different elements are linked together. These may or may not be spurious connections, 
they argue, but the point is that such a process often simplifies complex processes and 
categories (e.g. “Muslim” “extremist” “radicalisation”). There is also a focus on how the 
conjunction of certain facets or phenomena can lead to projections of what might happen, 
how future actions might cross “thresholds”. Thus they argue, counter culture symbols like 
long hair and permissive sexuality are seen to be more dangerous if they are linked to drug 
taking; cannabis smoking is seen in a dimmer light if it is seen to lead to heroin addiction and 
so on. Thus “threats” are amplified if those which exist on the boundaries of what is 
considered acceptable behaviour are painted as inevitably leading to threats of a higher order. 
Thus we might argue that in the present day, any issues, difficulties or problems that ethnic 
minority communities (and especially Muslims) might have are viewed as more than issues to 
do with social and cultural integration, more than problems of belonging and identity, and are 
seen more as processes/issues which may be a first step to radicalism and terrorism. Indeed, 
the government’s Channel programme is explicitly based on such a logic. Kundnani 
discusses how Channel, the deradicalisation programme that is one of the key components of 
Prevent, focuses on seemingly benign behavioural traits but which are seen as potential 
indicators of radicalisation. Thus ‘abandoning current associates in favour of a new social 
network, experiencing a crisis of identity or family separation, and expressing “real or 
imagined grievances”’ (Kundnani 2014, 154-5) are identified as factors which may indicate 
radicalisation. Thus minor, personal issues are heightened by their (potential) association 
with higher order risks. Hall et al. conclude that linking (seemingly) benign traits and 
behaviours with more serious disorder and security problems renders a wider swathe of 
behaviour amenable to government control. ‘When this process becomes a regular and 
routine part of the way in which conflict is signified in society, it does indeed create its own 
momentum for measures of “more than usual control”’ (Hall et al. 1978, 226). 
 
Echoing (or prefiguring) Wacquant’s sense in which law and order upsurges serve to create a 
chimera of control and order against a backdrop of broader socio-economic unease and fear, 
Hall et al. (1978, 321-2) state that despite the fact that crises (whether they be of the 1970s 
variants or more recent ones) create diffuse manifestations, the performance of law and order, 
however targeted, can provide a sense of reassurance. For Hall et al. the singling out of a 
minority or a moral panic in order to assuage fears and anxieties within the broader body 
politic is a spectacle as much as it is about crime/security 
 
The state comes to provide just that “sense of direction” which the lay public feels 
society has lost. The anxieties of the many are orchestrated with the need for control 
of the few… The state can now, publicly and legitimately, campaign against the 
“extremes” on behalf and in defence of the majority - the “moderates”. The “law-and-
order” society has slipped into place. 
 
Crucial to this is that the “crisis” is not a fiction. What is important is that it is the 
characterisation of the crisis and what to do about it that represent “distortions”: ‘The 
“ideology of the crisis”, which leads to and supports and finally finds its fulfilment in a “law-
and-order” society, refers to a real crisis, not to a “phoney” one. It is how that real crisis is 
perceived and controlled which contains the seeds of political and ideological distortion’ 
(Hall et al. 1978, 322). Thus, to draw from Hall et al.’s framework, it is not necessary or 
appropriate to suggest that authorities, or what Hall et al. (1978, 221) refer to as ‘primary 
definers’, are “inventing” concerns or problems, of economic crisis or terrorism; clearly the 
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horrific attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 are testament to the presence of terrorist 
violence. The ideological function, for Hall et al. is in the way such processes and events are 
represented and responded to. How such characterisations win the consent of the majority is 
of utmost concern to Hall et al.; how it is that such narratives resonate with the experiences of 
ordinary people. They go on to characterise a displacement effect, again something which 
chimes with Wacquant’s notion of a law and order “pornography”. They describe this 
displacement effect as taking a moral panic/resolution dynamic. Fears are projected and 
respite/resolutions are provided (although Hall et al. would see these as “false” resolutions). 
 
It is as if each surge of social anxiety finds a temporary respite in the projection of 
fears on to and into certain compellingly anxiety-laden themes: in the discovery of 
demons, the identification of folk -devils, the mounting of moral campaigns, the 
expiation of prosecution and control - in the moral-panic cycle (Hall et al. 1978, 322). 
 
Hall et al.’s analysis is rooted in the specific context of a period in British history and it 
would be unwise to draw straight and direct parallels. The point should not be simply that 
counter terrorism powers are used directly to police and constrain other forms of political 
protest (although there are examples of such things happening) but something more diffuse – 
that, bringing Hall et al., Wacqaunt and the Paris School together, the culture of control 
serves to a) create a moral panic around terrorism which serves to i) deflect from other forms 
of crisis and ii) give the state a role in a context where it has abrogated responsibilities which 
might attenuate (i) and b) represents a performance of sovereignty in the context of (a). The 
point about abrogation is a prime difference with the analysis conducted by Hall et al in the 
1970s, when such moves had only tentatively begun. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, two overlapping arguments have been developed. The first was that 
explanations of counter terrorism policy in places like the UK often focus on a form of 
executive decisionism, whether institutional or securitisation/exceptionalism. This tends to 
remove analysis of counter terrorism from “normal” politics (or “normal” political science). 
Such a removal or separation is problematic, empirically and conceptually. Rather than 
exhibiting a form of politics which eschews regular processes and rules, in favour of a closed, 
elite driven mode of policy, counter terrorism, at the national level, appears to be marked by 
contestation, debate and discussion. This led to a second argument, that studies of counter 
terrorism in the UK might be developed by thinking about it not as something “exceptional” 
or apart from British politics, but by examining counter terrorism through some of the key 
conceptual and analytical lenses of British politics. An examination of depoliticisation, 
neoliberalism as two such important themes, led to an analysis which suggested that counter 
terrorism, perhaps paradoxically, is a policy area not marked by depoliticisation (or 
securitisation). This overt politicisation can be made sense of through analyses of 
neoliberalism (such as Wacquant and Hall) which highlight how in a context of a state which 
has retreated from many of its traditional functions, counter terrorism offers the state an 
opportunity to perform its own “stateness”, to visibly display its sovereign power in a context 
of ever more (self-imposed) diminished powers. The work of Hall provides an analysis of 
how, by mobilising populist consent through moral panics, neoliberal states stage security in 
order to mask deeper insecurities. It also provides a historical background to suggest that 
attention to security and law and order issues to (paradoxically) complement a shift and 
reduction in the activities of the state may not be unprecedented in British politics, and may 
thus be part of a deeper and longer tradition of state management. 
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This argument contributes to and extends those literatures which have sought to move beyond 
stark distinctions between normal politics and securitised politics/exceptionalism. Authors 
noted above, such as Bigo and Huysmans have identified the ways in which security is not 
only something done, or spoken, by elites but something to which a range of voices 
contribute. Those associated with the Paris School, and IPS more broadly, have emphasised 
the bureaucratic field of security professionals and everyday “little security nothings”. Yet 
the argument presented here, through Wacquant and Hall, points to the broader political-
economic context in which elites, security professionals and “everyday” security politics play 
out. If, as Hall argues, we might see the (re)surgence of repertoires of domination and control 
that policies like enhanced counter terrorism measures represent as an intensification of 
“normal” politics and as something deeply productive and “useful” for that “normal” 
politics, (rather than a departure from it), our analyses of security politics perhaps should 
consider that broader political economic context of “normal” politics rather more fully. It is 
important to note, however, that qua Hall (and perhaps against some readings of Wacquant) 
the precise nature of the relationship between the broader political economic context and 
security politics is contingent and complex. Whilst it might be argued that neoliberalism 
strategically selects for government’s pursuing intensified security/counter terrorism policies 
(to permit the state to perform its own sovereignty in a context of declining influence and 
control in other areas), it does not determine this. Jessop (2008) identifies strategic selectivity 
as the context which privileges certain actors, identities, strategies and actions, and also 
points to the ways in which actors reflect, understand and learn from this context. Thus 
precisely how the embedding of market principles across the polity and the state’s self-
imposed withdrawal from traditional responsibilities shapes the strategies of actors (political 
elites, security professionals, media, community groups etc) around security politics is not 
predetermined. The argument here is that there is utility in focusing on such questions to aid 
understandings of the nature of contemporary counter terrorism and security politics. 
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